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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
-vs- Case No. 900452 
DOROTHY D'ASTON, etal., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The questions presented for review are set forth in Appellee's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
OPINIONS OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Two opinions were issued by the Utah Court of Appeals. The first 
dealt with the refusal of the appellant to submit to the process of the 
district court and is cited as D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 OJt. Ct. 
App. 1990") and contained in appellant's appendix exhibit "A". The 
second opinion dealt with the merits of the appeal and is cited as 
D'Aston v. D'Aston. 794 P.2d 500 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) and contained in 
appellant's appendix exhibit "B". 
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION 
The date of entry of the decision sought to be reviewed by 
appellee is June 14, 1990. The date of entry of the Order Denying 
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing is August 30, 1990. No cross-petition 
for a writ of certiorari has been filed. The statutory provision which 
confers jurisdiction on the Utah Supreme Court to review the decision in 
question is Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2-2(3)(a¥supp. 1990). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Appellant is not aware of any controlling provisions of 
constitutions, statutes, ordinances, or regulations. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this case, appellant, Dorothy D'Aston (Dorothy) and appellee, 
Bruno DfAston (Bruno) were married in September, 1953, and continued 
their state of matrimony for over thirty-five (35) years. 
In 1973, Bruno proposed a written property settlement 
agreement to Dorothy which was executed by both parties, notarized, 
and duly recorded in the State of California. 
Under the 1973 agreement, Dorothy received two parcels of real 
estate and cash in excess of $500,000.00. Bruno received gold, silver, 
bullion, exotic cars, patents, and foreign real estate in excess of 
$1,100,000.00. 
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In addition, the agreement provided that the parties would 
execute documents to implement the agreement, and that they had each 
read the agreement, been advised by counsel, and were not under 
duress, fraud, or undue influence. 
On May 2, 1986, Bruno filed this action for divorce and asserted 
that Dorothy's property should be divided with him, and further 
asserted, that part of his property had been stolen. 
On July 21, 1986, Sidney Troxell, Bruno's California attorney, who 
had actually prepared the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to coin dealers 
advising that Bruno's coins, with a value in excess of $1,000,000.00, had 
been stolen. 
On July 31, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy's attorney 
which stated that the 1973 agreement was in full force and effect. 
On August 21, 1986, Bruno assigned his rights under the 1973 
agreement to Sidney Troxell. 
On August 25, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy 
asserting his claim to all property awarded to Bruno under the 1973 
agreement. 
On September 5, 1986, Sidney Troxell filed a lawsuit in California 
against Dorothy, in his own behalf, and asserted that she had stolen 
$1,500,000.00 in coins, gold, and silver from Bruno which was his 
separate property under the 1973 agreement. 
At trial, however, Bruno claimed that the 1973 agreement was 
invalid, that he had no assets, that Dorothy or their son, Eric, had stolen 
his property, and that he should be awarded one-half of Dorothy's 
property. 
By contrast, Dorothy testified that all property had been 
transferred in 1973 according to the agreement. She produced detailed 
original documents and original checks for each asset owned by her 
after 1973. 
Bruno produced virtually no original documents, claiming that 
they had been stolen, but instead produced handwritten list after list of 
highly detailed inventories of coins, gold, and silver that he claimed 
were owned by him over a period of thirty-five (35) years. 
Bruno testified that he had engaged in highly profitable buying, 
selling, and trading of coins, gold, silver and exotic cars during the 
period of 1974 through 1986, but admitted that he had filed no income 
tax returns since 1974. He was convicted of a felony in 1973. He did 
not produce a financial declaration as required by the Rules of Practice 
in the 4th District Court setting forth his assets, income, and debts. 
The District Court ruled that the 1973 property settlement 
agreement was invalid and that Dorothy's property should be divided 
with Bruno. 
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
Trial was held on April 18-21, 1988, before the district court, 
sitting without a jury. 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and a Decree of Divorce were 
entered on December 15, 1988 (p. 467-538, Record on Appeal). 
Dorothy filed a Motion to Amend or Grant a New Trial which was 
denied by the district court on January 12, 1989 (p. 562-563, R.). 
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Dorothy filed her Notice of Appeal on January 23, 1989 (p. 579-
580, R.). 
During the pendancy of the appeal, the district court found 
Dorothy in contempt for failing to comply with certain provisions of the 
Decree of Divorce and for failing to submit to the process of the District 
Court (see Appendix Exhibit "C"). 
By its opinion dated April 9, 1989, the court of appeals stayed the 
appeal and allowed Dorothy 30 days to submit to process of the district 
court (D'Aston v. D'Aston. 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) (D'Aston D 
(see Appendix Exhibit "A"). 
Dorothy complied with the order of the court of appeals and gave 
notice of her appearance to the court of appeals on May 7, 1990 (see 
Appendix Exhibit "D"). 
The court of appeals accepted Dorothy's compliance with its order, 
addressed the merits of her appeal, and by its decision dated June 14, 
1990, reversed and remanded (P i s ton v. D'Aston. 794 P.2d 500 (Utah 
App. 1990) (P i s ton ID (see Appendix Exhibit "B"). 
The trial court entered its order regarding contempt on May 22, 
1990, and continued the time for considering the matter until October 
26, 1990 (see Appendix Exhibit "C"). 
Upon further consideration of the matter on October 26, 1990, the 
trial court found that Dorothy did not have the ability to comply with 
the order of May 22, 1990, ordered her committed to jail for five days 
with said commitment being suspended upon the payment of a fine in 
the sum of $250.00 (see Appendix Exhibit "E"). 
Dorothy paid the fine on November 15, 1990 (see Appendix 
Exhibit "F"). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, Bruno D'Aston, and Defendant, Dorothy D'Aston, 
were married September 22, 1953, in New York City, New York (page 
1402 line 9-12, Record on Appeal). 
2. Bruno was 29 years of age and Dorothy was 21 when they 
were married (p. 1768 line 2, p. 1622 line 15, R.). 
3. At the time of the marriage, Dorothy testified that Bruno 
had $5,000.00 cash and a 1952 Oldsmobile (p. 1402 linel8-23, R.). 
4. At the time of the marriage, Bruno testified that he had 
patents, stamps, coins, silver and gold worth $567,700.00 (p. 686 line 
21 - p.687 line 14, R. and Exhibit 8). 
5. During the marriage, Bruno became a multi-millionaire by 
his work at Aston Laboratories and by buying, selling and trading coins, 
silver, gold, and exotic cars (p. 599 line 17 - p. 600 line 8, R.). 
6. During the marriage, Bruno applied for and received many 
patents, which he valued at not less than $100,000.00 (p. 825 line 23 
p. 826 line 6, p. 830 line 9-24, R. and Exhibit 35). 
7. On March 1, 1973, Bruno presented a property settlement 
agreement to Dorothy for her consideration, which had been prepared 
by Sidney Troxell, Bruno's attorney in California (p. 833 line 21 - p. 834 
line 10, p. 1413 line 8 - p. 1414 line 14, R. and Exhibit 37). 
8. At the time of executing the 1973 property settlement 
agreement, the parties owned a home in Los Angeles and real estate in 
the City of Industry, California (p. 838 line 1-3, p. 1414 line 15-19, R. 
and Exhibit 37). 
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148, '*- : 
novmg ) rovo„ Tllah and purchasing a home, 
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17. By contrast, Bruno claimed to have retired in 1974, that he 
earned no income from 1974 through 1986, and that he had filed no tax 
returns (p. 831 line 22 - p. 832 line 15, p. 600 line 9-18, R.). 
18. Furthermore, Bruno claimed to have no records because 
they were stolen. He initially claimed that one four-drawer file cabinet 
contained all of his records, but later claimed that he had 12 filing 
cabinets containing his records (p. 1809 line 6 - p. 1810 line 20, R.) 
19. On April 30, 1986, Dorothy told Bruno to leave, that she 
could not put up with his lies anymore, and that the marriage was 
finished (p. 1667 line 7 - p. 1668 line 6, R.). 
20. After April 30, 1986, Bruno went to stay with his friend, 
Ray Coleman, a retired Provo policeman (p. 1181 line 14-23 and p. 1887 
line 22-25, R.). 
21 . On May 2, 1986, Bruno filed a Complaint for Divorce (p. 1-4, 
R.). 
22. On May 20 and 21, 1986, some twenty (20) days after the 
alleged incident of April 30, 1986, Bruno had Officer Phillips and Officer 
Scott prepare police incident reports (p. 1230 line 21-23, p. 1568 line 
25 - p. 1569 line 1-5, R.). 
23. On July 21, 1986, Sidney Troxell, Bruno's California attorney, 
who had actually prepared the 1973 property settlement agreement, 
sent a letter to coin dealers advising that Bruno's coins, with a value in 
excess of $1,000,000.00 had been stolen (p. 1914, R.). 
24. On July 31, 1986, Sidney Troxell sent a letter to Dorothy 
which stated that the 1973 agreement was in full force and effect 
(Exhibit 41). 
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Dorothy should take -\ polygraph, and if she did not, the court would 
•5-438, p. 541-547, R.). 
Q 
33. On November 17, 1988, the district court ruled the 1973 
agreement invalid, ordered no alimony, and divided Dorothy's property 
with Bruno (p. 440-453, R.). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Appellant complied with the orders of both the court of appeals 
and the trial court. 
The decision of DfAston II is in harmony with well established 
principles of contract law and with prior decisions of the Utah Court of 
Appeals and the Utah Supreme Court. 
Appellant's bare allegation of theft does not constitute a unique 
and compelling circumstance which would justify distributing the 
separate property of his spouse. 
Appellee's complaint that the court of appeals misinterpreted the 
agreement is merely an attempt to introduce new theories or re-argue 
old theories which were rejected at trial and not appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT COMPLIED WITH THE ORDERS OF BOTH THE COURT OF 
APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT. 
The function for a Petition for Writ of Certiorari is to present to 
the court issues which are special and important, and which therefore 
require review by the supreme court. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure provides in part: 
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.en r. pnr.^ -f i v ^our! of Appeals 
has decided a question wi Niate 01 federal 
law in a way that is in conflict ' * 
d e u - - - * n o f f k^ Si?pT,-f*'* f^ "**-* 
(c) \ \ hen a panel of the Coiii it of Appeals 
has rendered a decisioi i that has so fai 
departed from the accepted and usual 
course of judicial proceedings or has so far 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower 
court as to call for an exercise of the 
Supreme €01111:'s power of si ipervision; 
(d) VV hen the Court of Appeals has 
decided an impoi taiit question of 
municipal, state, or federal law which has 
not been.., but shot lid be, settled by the 
Supreme Court. 
Appellee (Bruno) argues that the court of appeals failed to icquire 
con lpliance ' * ith its ::: ! 11 :)i & z 1 ai L :i therefore ()ursimn '" |nest - • f r 
review is wor thy of f 1 11 thei consideration. 
On the contrary, however; the court of appeals stated: 
We... oiui . im wife to submit herself to the 
process ot tne trial tot * .othm ;^ -**ys or we 
will dismiss her appeal Aite ga\e as notice of 
her compliance with our order of May 4, 1990, 
and iherefore we address the merits of her 
appeal this opinion (D'Aston IP 
Furthr 'd (In1 oidn 1 
contempt, found that Dorothy did noi ha*-/ n . .indity *° **miply, and 
1 1 
imposed a fine of $250.00 which she has paid (see Appendix Exhibit 
"F"). 
Accordingly, Bruno's request for review of Question 2 is without 
merit and should be denied. Both the court of appeals and the trial 
court have been satisfied with respect to this issue. 
II. THE DECISION OF D'ASTON II IS IN HARMONY WITH WELL 
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW AND WITH PRIOR 
DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE SUPREME COURT. 
Bruno argues that DfAston II conflicts with prior decisions of the 
court of appeals and of this court. This is simply not the case. 
P i s t o n II adopts the following propositions: 
1. In Utah, prenuptial agreements are 
enforceable as long as there is no fraud, coercion, 
or material nondisclosure (Huck v. Huck. 734 
P.2d 417. 419 (Utah 1986)) (Berman v. Berman. 
749 P.2d 127L 1273 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988)). 
2. Other jurisdictions review postnuptial 
property agreements under the same standards 
as those applied to prenuptial agreements (In re 
Estate of Harber. 449 P.2d 7. 16 (1969) 
(Arizona)): (In re Estate of Lewin. 595 P.2d 1055. 
1057 (1979) (Colorado)): (In re Estate of 
Loughmiller. 692 P.2d 156. 162 (1981) (Kansas)): 
(In re Estate of Gab. 364 N.W.2d 924. 925-26 
(1985) (South Dakota)): and (Button v. Button. 
388 N.W.2d 546. 550-51 (1986)(Wisconsin)). 
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... , postnuptial agreements are 
enforceable absent fraud, coercion, 01 material 
nondisclosure (Huck v. Huck. et al. supra p. 12: 
In re Estate of Harber, et ah, supra p.. 1.2). 
General contract principles appU A : I _ 
interpreting prenuptial and postnupna 1 
agreements (Berman v. Berman supra p. 12' 
(Matlock v. Matlock. 576 P.2d 629, 633 (1978)) 
(Roberts v. Roberts. 381 So.2d 1333. 1335 
(1980)) (Bosone v. Bosone. 768 P.2d 1022.. , . -
25 (1989)) 
5 In construing a contract, use Lourt wiii hrst 
look to the four corners of the agreement t. 
determine the parties intentions (Nielsen v. 
Nielsen, 780 P2£ 1264, 1,167 (Ut. Ct, App. 
1989)). 
6, Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties'"1 
intent is permissible only if the contract 
document appears to express the parties' 
agreement incompletely, or if it is ambiguous in 
expressing that agreement ( 1 1 ielsen v. Nielsei i.„ 
supra p. 13) (Anderson v, Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 
(Utah 1982)). 
7 rhe determination of vi hether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law (Buehner Block 
Company, 752 P.2d 895) and (Whitehouse v. 
Whitehouse, 131 Utah Adv. Rep. 28. 30 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1990)). 
1 ^ 
All of the above propositions are well-reasoned rules of law. 
Bruno argues that these principles conflict with the case of 
Coleman v. Coleman. 743 P.2d 782 (1987). However, the facts of 
Coleman do not apply to this case, nor does the reasoning. 
In the instant case, the 1973 agreement was executed, notarized, 
recorded, deeds exchanged, and property valued at over $1,100,000.00 
transferred to Bruno, and real estate and cash valued at over 
$500,000.00 transferred to Dorothy. Thirteen (13) years passed before 
Bruno filed for divorce and claimed the agreement was not binding. 
There is a difference between a long-standing marital contract and a 
proposed stipulation that is submitted for approval and inclusion in a 
divorce decree, as set forth in Coleman. 
The "compelling circumstances" language found in the case of 
Foulger v. Foulger. 626 P.2d 412. 414 (Utah 19811 may also be easily 
distinguished. The Foulger case dealt with the standard to be used 
when reviewing a petition for modification of a divorce decree, and in 
particular, modifying provisions of a divorce decree dealing with the 
disposition of real property. By contrast, D'Aston II deals specifically 
with the enforceability of a postnuptial agreement. Accordingly, 
D'Aston II is properly governed by well established principles of 
contract law and is not in conflict with prior decisions of the court of 
appeals and this court. 
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A UNIQUE AND COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY 
DISTRIBUTING THE SEPARATE PROPERTY OF HIS SPOUSE. 
Bruno argues thai 'i * allegation o< tlu-'s .igainsi Dorothy 
- My 
the nmti . imdmg Noioih\ ^ separate prop^m wuh \)u \ rci 'd 
shows fha» *»..... dlecMpons t :• "e mam " Biurio^ v * 
These ^ ; . ^ . .. .. ^ i . . >\.: .1 . proven . <ninn wrn* ,ike to 
f
 S 
as>t*Hion Win .u»i\ considered in -n M M » .HI ano the coun -I" 
appeals, and rejects rhe tria1 -*'jr - ,M«...-;n, rccitcu ui ' ariies' 
" - - ^ dispute* , , ,. , , . ..jke anv ruLit^ 
whatsoever • \U.n 
as aut ^ ;* ,HN ar^un Noble :n * ! e.t^ nnguished 
Noble involve! i n-.r , t '.i tiding of tortious rnndnr \ w\\w *** <c 
husba* 
the vviie hie*: - divorce am- n . ^»ni! H,riie?eo Min^ianual ^e; ?«i 
property to flic wife whuh had bHon«?p<* rhe hushar l l he iear 
d is I N K I HI 1 :. 1 
had even proven >?».n .* ihefi occurred, let alone who was supposed to 
have committed the offense. 
Bi i mo c ontinues to argue his version of l he I acts without 
acknowledging that, after presenting four (4) days worth of evidence, 
the trial court was not persuaded that Dorothy was involved in any 
way. 
Finally, Bruno argues that some of the disputed coins were later 
found in the possession of his son, Eric. Any reference to Case No. 
900223-CA (Appellee's Appendix Exhibit I) is irrelevant and improper 
in this court. Dorothy was not a party to the dispute between Bruno 
and his son, Eric, nor was she represented by counsel in that case. 
IV. APPELLEES COMPLAINT THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS 
MISINTERPRETED THE AGREEMENT IS MERELY AN ATTEMPT TO 
INTRODUCE NEW THEORIES OR RE-ARGUE OLD THEORIES WHICH WERE 
REJECTED AT TRIAL AND NOT APPEALED. 
Appellee argues that the court of appeals misinterpreted the 
agreement. This complaint does not form the basis of review under 
Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Bruno argues again 
that he should be able to reopen the issue of an alleged theft in order to 
defeat the clear language of the 1973 agreement and the specific 
instructions of the court of appeals. This, the court should decline to 
allow. 
Bruno introduces a new theory of his case by suggesting that it 
would be acceptable to him if the court determined that the properties 
were separate and then proceeded to divide Dorothy*s separate 
property with him. This is an irrational attempt to acknowledge what 
cannot be denied (the validity of the 1973 agreement) and yet convey 
some or all of Dorothy's property to Bruno under a theory of equity. 
16 
. i.j-^uc- Nfs ; i^ah'o as separate 
property, Dorotlu s property should iv divided with h r. ^ 
based upon * < - -• i ^ _
 r ^ , _ 
not proven . . av xoi, •u.uuv an equitaMe reason i disregard le 
agreement o! *he parties This should n. be allowed. The court of 
i Mr record sfj^ w , r..:« r - . asserts t; .* "nahdJtv V ^Q"^ 
agreement ^ 1-1" <« -»» * ! - • '-p—^ a^ert* •• »(,dity whet 
latitude to disregard the intent , :KJ agreement ind convey boiw -._ all 
oi jJe^otln ' - - . -< 
; ncre ... o iuuu> in the record to supper* *h? existence of 
unique and ompellim1 circumstances which wo aid justify disregarding 
* * • < * 1 \ , , , i • * 
Appellant complied with the orders ui _ • _ die court oi appeals 
; ;H decisio- " D'Aston II is in harmony with well established 
principles o* > ontraci law and with prior decisions of the Utah Court of 
^•1 J- 1 Supreme ("oiifI, 
Appellants bare a i i ^ a h o n «>! theft does not constitute a -AU\ ;UV 
and rompelli'n^ circumstance whie ,• - | istil y dislMhnlnn.- i n 
separate spouse,, 
Appellee's complaint that the court of appeals misinterpreted the 
agreement is merely an attempt to introduce new theories or re-argue 
old theories which were rejected at trial and not appealed. 
Appellant respectfully urges this court to deny the Appellee's 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari. 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
\x~ c £ 
Brian C. Harrison ' 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Brief in Opposition to S. Rex Lewis and Leslie W. Slaugh, 120 
East 300 North, P.O. Box 778, Provo, UT 84603, postage prepaid, this 
27th day of November, 1990. 
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[5] Further, in viewing all the facts in 
the light most favorable to Brinkerhoff, we 
can find no prejudice. Harris v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217, 222-23 (Utah 
1983); Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hard-
ware Co., 631 P.2d 865, 868 (Utah 1981). 
Brinkerhoff neither below nor on appeal 
articulates how he was prejudiced by DLS's 
failure to notify him in the notice of hear-
ing that the hearing was going to be infor-
mal. It seems clear that no prejudice 
would ordinarily occur when an informal 
hearing is held under the UAPA because 
the litigant has an absolute right to a trial 
de novo before the district court. In this 
trial de novo, Brinkerhoff was able to 
present his entire case before a new tribu-
nal for an independent decision. Based 
upon the foregoing, we find the trial court 
erred in revoking the order of suspension 
on the basis that the notice of hearing sent 
by DLS did not state whether the adminis-
trative hearing was to be formal or infor-
mal as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-3(2)(a)(v) (1989). 
REASONS FOR THE DECISION 
UNDER SECTION 63-46b-5 
Brinkerhoff also alleges that DLS violat-
ed Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-5(l)(i) (1989) 
by failing to set forth specific reasons for 
its suspension of his driving privileges. 
This statute states, in pertinent part, that 
<4[w]ithin a reasonable time after the close 
of an informal adjudicative proceeding, the 
presiding officer shall issue a signed order 
in writing that states the following: . . . (ii) 
the reasons for the decision." 
[6] We dispose of this issue on similar 
groundSo First, Brinkerhoff failed to raise 
an objection so as to allow DLS to cure any 
defect, and second, Brinkerhoff does not 
claim, let alone demonstrate, that he was 
prejudiced by any alleged error. 
The record below shows that Brinkerhoff 
made no request of DLS to provide him 
with more specific reasons for the suspen-
sion of his license. As stated above, a 
failure to object to an error and allow a 
tribunal to correct its error precludes an 
appellant from asserting the issue on ap-
peal Loyez i\ Schwendimany 720 P.2d 
778, 781 (Utah 1986); Condas v. Condas, 
618 P.2d 491, 495 n. 8 (Utah 1980). 
Finally, Brinkerhoff does not allege, and 
cannot show, prejudice because, under the 
statutory scheme, he was allowed a trial de 
novo after which the trial court has the 
responsibility to enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law justifying its decision. 
In summary, the trial de novo cured any 
technical procedural errors occurring at the 
informal DLS hearing. The purpose of al-
lowing an agency to choose an informal 
hearing procedure would be defeated if 
technical, non-prejudicial, procedural errors 
were sufficient to overturn the agency ac-
tion. The statutory trial de novo is the 
proper remedy to cure these non-prejudicial 
errors. 
We find that Brinkerhoff failed to object 
and preserve his alleged errors. Further-
more, we hold that the trial de novo in the 
district court provided by the UAPA elimi-
nated any prejudice to defendant. We 
therefore reverse and remand for entry of 
an order to reinstate DLS's suspension of 
Brinkerhoff s driving privileges. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ.f concur. 
( o | <fY NUMBER SYST£M> 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al„ Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 390050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 9, 1990. 
Divorce action was brought. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
an opportunity to order a continuance to reme- dy any problem with notice. 
D'ASTON v. 
Cite as 790 ?2d 590 
L. ParK, J., entered judgment, and wife 
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
J., held that: (1) service on wife's attorney 
of order to show cause why wife should not 
be held in contempt was sufficient where 
wife secreted herself to prevent service of 
order, and (2) wife would be given 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court, and if she failed to do so, her appeal 
would be dismissed. 
Ordered accordingly. 
1. Divorce <3=>269(8) 
Service on wife's attorney of order to 
show cause why wife should not be held in 
contempt in divorce proceedings was suffi-
cient where wife initially had been served 
with process in case and appeared by coun-
sel in matter but subsequently secreted 
herself to prevent service of order to show 
cause. 
2. Divorce <3=>278 
Wife, who had secreted herself and 
refused to submit to process of district 
court in divorce action, would have 30 days 
to bring herself within process of trial 
court if she wished to appeal divorce judg-
ment: however, if wife persisted in secret-
ing herself in violation of trial court orders, 
her appeal would be subject to dismissal. 
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Provo, for 
defendants-appellants. 
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Howard. Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for 
plaintiff-appellee. 




Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston, filed an ap-
peal from a divorce decree entered by the 
trial court on December 15, 1988. Appel-
lee, Bruno D'Aston ("Mr. D'Aston"), filed a 
Motion to Dismiss appellant's appeal on the 
grounds that she was currently in con-
tempt of the trial court's order and had 
secreted herself, refusing to submit to the 
D'ASTON Utah 5 9 1 
(UtahApp. 1990) 
process of the district court. He thus ar-
gues that appellant shouid not be allowed 
to seek a review of the divorce decree on 
the merits. We agree with Mr. D'Aston 
and therefore stay this appeal and allow 
appellant 30 days from the date of the 
issuance of this opinion to submit to the 
process of the trial court and to give this 
court notice of her actions. If appellant 
complies with this court's order and gives 
this court written verification of her com-
pliance within the 30-day period, then we 
will consider her appeal on the merits. 
However, if appellant fails to submit to the 
process of the trial court within the 30-day 
period, the motion to dismiss her appeal 
will be granted. 
FACTS 
We only discuss the facts relevant to this 
order, not the underlying dispute. 
At the time of trial, appellant testified 
that she had $300,000 in cash in a safe 
deposit box in Far West Bank and $75,000 
in cash in a safe at home. In the divorce 
decree, the trial court ordered appellant to 
pay Mr. D'Aston $236,300 "from the $300,-
000.00 in the safe deposit box." To date, 
appellant has failed to comply with that 
order. 
The trial court issued a writ of execution 
directing the constable to execute on the 
safe deposit box at Far West Bank. The 
constable discovered that no such safe de-
posit box under appellant's name existed, 
nor did she have any substantial assets at 
Far West Bank. 
Mr. D'Aston, on January 11, 1989, filed a 
Motion to Compel Compliance with Decree 
of the Court. On January 23, 1989. appel-
lant filed a Motion for Stay and Approval 
of Supersedeas Bond. The trial court or-
dered a stay and set the amount of the 
supersedeas bond, which was to be posted 
within 30 days. Appellant failed to post a 
supersedeas bond. 
Mr. D'Aston, on March 17, 1989, obtained 
an Order to Show Cause directing appellant 
to appear and show cause why she should 
not be held in contempt for her failure to 
pay Mr. D'Aston the $236,800 ordered in 
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the decree or to post a supersedeas bond. 
The process server could not find appellant 
in order to serve the Order to Show Cause. 
However, her counsel was served with a 
copy of the Order to Show Cause. 
On March 22, 1989, the trial court held a 
hearing on Mr. D'Aston's Motion to Compel 
Compliance. Appellant's counsel was in 
court that day and the judge requested his 
appearance at the hearing. Appellant's 
counsel stated he was making a special 
appearance as he had not been given prop-
er notice of the hearing. 
On April 7, 1989, the court held an order 
to show cause hearing. Neither appellant 
nor her counsel was present In a minute 
entry, the court noted that the March 22, 
1989, hearing had been continued to April 
7, 1989, and that appellant's counsel had 
been informed of this fact at the March 22, 
1989, hearing. In addition, the record re-
flects that appellant's counsel was served 
with the Order to Show Cause which listed 
the April 7, 1989, hearing date. 
On April 13, 1989, the court entered find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law holding 
appellant in contempt of court because she 
was purposefully hiding herself from the 
jurisdiction of the Court and from service," 
and issued an order of commitment and 
bench warrant. The court amended its or-
der of commitment on May 26, 1989. Ap-
pellant again evaded service. Appellant's 
counsel however, was served with the find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and the 
order of commitment. 
Thereafter, appellant's counsel made a 
Motion to Strike Findings of Fact, Order of 
Commitment and Bench Warrant. He as-
serts that he does not know where appel-
lant is and that his current representation 
is now limited to this appeal. That motion 
was denied. 
NOTICE 
In response to Mr. D'Aston's motion to 
dismiss her appeal, appellant argues that 
since she has not been served with the 
Order to Show Cause, the trial court was 
1. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to hold 
that no formal adjudication of contempt is nec-
essary in order to dismiss the appeal for failure 
without authority to hold her in contempt. 
Appellant thus contends this court may not 
dismiss her appeal for failure to comply 
with the trial court's orders. 
[1] Utah courts have acknowledged the 
importance of actual notice in contempt 
proceedings. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 
118, 378 P.2d 519, 520 (1963); see generally 
Von Hake v. Thomas. 759 P.2d 1162, 1171-
72 (Utah 1988). However, whether a court 
can issue a civil order of contempt without 
personal service where a party purposeful-
ly hides to prevent service of the order has 
not been addressed to date in Utah. None-
theless, we are in accord with other juris-
dictions which have held that where a party 
initially has been served with process in a 
case, and has appeared by counsel in the 
matter, service of an order to show cause 
why the party should not be held in con-
tempt on the party's attorney is sufficient. 
See Kottemann v. Kottemann, 150 Cal. 
App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 52 (1957); Brewer 
v. Brewer, 206 Ga. 93, 55 S.E.2d 593, 594 
(1949); State ex rel. Brubaker v. Pritch-
ard, 236 Ind. 222. 138 N.E.2d 233, 236 
(1956); Cap low v. Eighth Judicial Dist 
Court 72 New 265. 302 P.2d 755, 756 
(1956); Macdermid i\ Macdermid, 116 Vt. 
237, 73 A.2d 315, 31S (1950); see generally 
Annotation, Sufficiency of notice to, or 
service upon, contemnor's attorney in 
civil contempt proceedings, 60 A.L.R.2d 
1244 (1958). 
In Kottemann, which is factually similar 
to this case, the plaintiff had left his resi-
dence and thus could not be served with a 
motion for contempt. 310 P.2d at 50. The 
plaintiffs attorneys were served with the 
motion. Id. at 50-51. The attorneys then 
asserted they did not know the where-
abouts of their client and only had authori-
ty to represent him in the appeal. Id. at 
r\. The court rejected the attorneys' at-
tempts to limit their authority and conclud-
ed that the service of the order to show 
cause upon the attorneys was proper. Id. 
at 52.l 
to comply with a trial court's order. See Tobin 
v. Casaus. 123 Cal.ADp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954) (party could not be found for service of 
D'ASTON v. 
Cite as 790 P2d 590 
The trial court found that appellant was 
secreting herself to avoid service of pro-
cess in this matter. Appellant's counsel 
was served with notice of the Motion to 
Compel Compliance, the Order to Show 
Cause regarding contempt, and the court's 
findings of contempt. Appellant's counsel 
appeared at the March 22, 1989, hearing on 
the Motion to Compel Compliance and was 
given notice of the Order to Show Cause 
hearing. Because appellant has purpose-
fully hidden to avoid service of process and 
notice of the contempt proceedings and the 
court's order was given to appellant's at-
torney, we find the trial court's order of 
contempt was properly entered. 
CONTEMPT 
[2] Likewise, Utah's appellate courts 
have not considered whether they may dis-
miss a civil appeal when the appellant is in 
contempt of a trial court order in the same 
action. However, in the area of criminal 
appeals, the Utah Supreme Court has dis-
missed the appeal of a prisoner after he 
escaped custody. State v. Tuttle, 713 P.2d 
703, 704 (Utah 1985); see also Hardy v. 
Morris. 636 P.2d 473, 474 (Utah 1981) 
(court dismissed an escapee's appeal from a 
dismissal of a writ of habeas corpus). In 
Tuttle. the Utah Supreme Court refined its 
position in Hardy. The court held that an 
appellant prisoner's escape is not an aban-
donment of his right to appeal and that the 
dismissal of his appeal is not an appropri-
ate punishment for his escape. Tuttle, 713 
P.2d at 704-05. The court stressed the 
fundamental right to appellate review of a 
criminal conviction when reinstating the ap-
peal after the prisoner was returned to 
custody. Id. at 705. 
Appellate courts from other jurisdictions 
have dismissed the civil appeals of contu-
macious parties without allowing the par-
ties an opportunity to bring themselves 
into compliance with the trial court's order. 
Rude v. Rude, 153 Cal.App.2d 2.o, 314 
P.2d 226, 230 (1957) (failure to pay support 
and attorney fees); Kottemann v. Kottem-
ann, 150 Cal.App.2d 483, 310 P.2d 49, 53 
process;; Pike v. Pike. 24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 
401, 404 (1946) (party secreted herself and her 
D'ASTON Utah 5 9 3 
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(1957) (failure to pay alimony and attorney 
fees); Michael v. Michael. 253 N.E.2d 261, 
263 (Ind.1969) (appellant took child in viola-
tion of custody order and fled jurisdiction); 
In re Morrell 174 Ohio St. 427. 189 N.E.2d 
873, 874 (Ohio 1963) (appellant took child in 
violation of custody order and could not be 
found); Huskey v. Huskey, 284 S.C. 504, 
327 S.E.2d 359, 360 (Ct.App.1985) (party 
left jurisdiction to avoid arrest). Other 
courts have allowed the party time to com-
ply with the trial court's order before dis-
missing the appeal. Stewart v. Stewart, 
91 Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962) (30 
days to comply); Tobin v. Casaus, 128 
Cal.App.2d 588,"275 P.2d 792, 795 (1954) (30 
days to comply); Greenwood v. Green-
wood, 191 Conn. 309, 464 A.2d 771, 774 
(1983) (30 days to comply); Pasin v. Pasin, 
517 So.2d 742, 742 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) 
(15 days to comply); In re Marriage of 
Marks, 96 Ill.App.3d 360, 51 Ill.Dec. 626, 
629, 420 N.E.2d 1184. 1187 (1981) (30 days 
to comply); Henderson v. Henderson, 329 
Mass. 257, 107 N.E.2d 773, 774 (1952) (30 
days to comply); Prevenas v. Prevenas, 
193 Neb. 399, 227 N.W.2d 29, 30 (1975) (20 
days to comply); Hemenway v. Hemen-
way, 114 R.I. 718, 339 A.2d 247, 250 (1975) 
(30 days to comply); Strange v. Strange, 
464 S.W.2d 216, 219 (Tex.Civ.App.1970) (per 
curiam) (10 days to comply); Pike v. Pike, 
24 Wash.2d 735, 167 P.2d 401, 404 (1946) 
(10 days to comply). These courts justify 
the dismissal of the appeals on the ground 
that it violates the principles of justice to 
allow a party who flaunts the orders of the 
courts to seek judicial assistance. See, e.g., 
Stewart. 372 P.2d at TOO; Rude, 314 P.2d 
at 230; Greenwood. 464 A.2d at 773; 
Strange, 464 S.W.2d at 219. 
Still another approach is to stay the ap-
peal until the appellant has submitted to 
the process of the trial court. This ap-
proach gives the trial court the flexibility 
to fashion the terms under which the non-
complying party may purge its contempt 
rather than necessarily ordering the en-
forcement of the judgment. In Closset v. 
Closset, 71 New SO? 2S0 P.2d 290, 291 
children to avoid custodv order and service of 
process). 
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(1955), the appellant had failed to comply 
with a trial court order in a divorce pro-
ceeding and had been found in contempt. 
The Nevada Supreme Court did not dismiss 
his appeal for failure to comply with the 
judgment below, but held that the appeal 
would be dismissed unless the appellant 
within 30 days submitted himself to the 
process of the trial court or posted a super-
sedeas bond. Id. 280 P.2d at 291. The 
court stated: 
[A]ppellant husband is now a fugitive 
from process of the trial court. We shall 
not permit him to avail himself of judicial 
review while at the same time he places 
himself beyond reach of the process of 
the trial court in defiance of its attempts 
to enforce its judgment 
We do but insist that one seeking the 
aid of the courts of this state should 
remain throughout the course of such 
proceeding, amenable to all judicial pro-
cess of the state which may issue in 
connection with such proceeding. 
Id. at 291 (emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court con-
sidered an appellate court's dismissal of a 
civil appeal on the basis that the appellant 
was in contempt of the trial court's order in 
National Union of Marine Cooks & Stew-
ards v. Arnold. 348 U.S. 37, 75 S.Ct. 92, 99 
L.Ed. 46 (1954). The Court was asked to 
decide whether the Washington Supreme 
Court violated either the equal protection 
clause or the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment when it dismissed 
an appeal from a money judgment as a 
reasonable measure for safeguarding the 
collectibility of that judgment. The appel-
lant had filed a notice of appeal but had 
offered no supersedeas bond and had ob-
tained no stay of the proceedings. Id. at 
39, 75 S.Ct. at 93-94. The trial court or-
dered the appellant to deliver certain bonds 
in its possession to the court's receiver for 
safekeeping pending disposition of the ap-
peal. Id. The appellant refused and was 
held in contempt. Id. As a result, the 
Washington Supreme Court struck the ap-
2. Utah Const, art VIII, § 5 provides, in pertinent 
part: "Except for matters filed originally with 
the supreme court, there shall be in all cases an 
peal on the merits, giving the appellant 15 
days to purge its contempt by delivering 
the bonds. Id. at 40, 75 S.Ct. at 94. The 
United States Supreme Court found no con-
stitutional violation, stating that "[w]hile a 
statutory review is important and must be 
exercised without discrimination, such a re-
view is not a requirement of due process." 
Id. at 43, 75 S.Ct. at 95. The Court 
stressed that "[petitioner's appeal was not 
dismissed because of petitioner's failure to 
satisfy a judgment pending an appeal from 
it It was dismissed because of petitioner's 
failure to comply with the court's order to 
safeguard petitioner's assets from dissipa-
tion pending such appeal." Id. at 44, 75 
S.Ct. at 96. 
We are persuaded that the Closset ap-
proach is most consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's Tuttle decision and the 
United States Supreme Court's Arnold de-
cision. By adopting this approach, we do 
not deny appellant her right to an appeal 
under Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5,- but rath-
er insist she must submit herself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court and satisfy 
that court's concerns before she may exer-
cise that right She merely has the obli-
gation to come forward and offer a reason-
able alternative to the trial court to safe-
guard her assets from dissipation pending 
her appeal. 
Appellant was given the opportunity to 
post a supersedeas bond, but has refused. 
She has ignored the orders of the trial 
court and, apart from obtaining a tempo-
rary stay which she allowed to lapse for 
want of a bond, she has provided no rea-
sonable alternative to allow the court to 
insure that her assets are available to satis-
fy the judgment pending appeal. By her 
actions, appellant is frustrating the admin-
istration of justice. 
Appellant has not claimed that she did 
not have the ability to comply with the trial 
court's order. See Stewart v. Stewart, 91 
Ariz. 356, 372 P.2d 697, 700 (1962). This 
situation is similar to one faced by a Cali-
appeal of right from the court of original juris-
diction to a court with appellate jurisdiction 
over the cause." 
DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. 
Cite as 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990) 
L'tah 595 
fornia court, where it found it was ''dealing 
with a litigant who not only has previously 
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to 
this very time remains a fugitive from jus-
tice. Apparently, he is unwilling to re-
spond to a court order with which he dis-
agrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a 
more favorable result Tobin v. Caserns, 
128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954). 
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 
days from the date of the issuance of this 
opinion to bring herself within the process 
of the trial court. If appellant submits 
herself to the trial court, she should be 
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives 
to the trial court to protect the judgment. 
Appellant may persuade the court it should 
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust 
until a resolution of this appeal on the 
merits. However, if appellant persists in 
secreting herself in violation of the trial 
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed 
at the expiration of the 30-day period. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers: Monica 
Henwood. individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Ramon 
Henwood. deceased: Phyllis Henwood: 
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a corporation; The State of Utah; 
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through 
100, inclusive. Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 890291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 12, 1990. 
Heirs of victims of train-automobile ac-
cident brought action against railroad, De-
partment of Transportation and railroad 
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered 
summary judgment dismissing wrongful 
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Dis-
trict Judge, held that: (1) heirs failed to 
establish that either engineer or railroad 
were negligent and (2) Department, having 
given at least some warning or control at 
railroad crossing, was governmentally im-
mune in deciding whether to improve 
means of warning or control at crossing 
because of fiscal effects of decision. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the Estate of 
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E. 
Duncan, a minor by and through his 
Guardian ad Litem: Alice Duncan; No-
reen Duncan; Michael Duncan: Tim 
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Dun-
can; Michelle Bowers, individually and 
as personal representative of the Estate 
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased: 
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson; 
1. Railroads <3=348<1) 
Evidence failed to support claim of 
heirs of accident victims that there was 
negligence in operation of train or entrust-
ing its operation to engineer who was in 
charge at time of automobile-train collision. 
L Railroads e=>348<2) 
Evidence did not support claim of heir? 
of accident victims that railroad negligently 
maintained railroad right-of-way at cross 
ing with street where train-automobile colli 
sion occurred: there was nothing to indi 
cate what could have made railroad's right 
EXfflBIT B 
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judgment or order of the circuit court. 
They, therefore, reason that this is an ex-
ception to the general delegation of appel-
late jurisdiction over circuit court orders to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Again, we do not disagree with the de-
fendants' argument in the abstract, but 
cannot decipher how the argument helps 
them. Defendants still point to no statute 
giving the district court jurisdiction over 
appeals from the decisions of a magistrate 
under Rule 7. In fact, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1989) vests "interlocutory 
appeals from any court of record in crimi-
nal cases, except those involving a first 
degree or capital felony" in the Utah Court 
of Appeals. Certainly the magistrate was 
acting as a court of record in a criminal 
case when it held the preliminary hearing. 
Finally, both defendants make a number 
of policy arguments in favor of giving the 
district courts jurisdiction over objections 
to bindover orders alleging insufficiency of 
the evidence. Although some of their con-
tentions have merit,8 such arguments must 
be made to the legislature. It is the legis-
lature which is charged with the task of 
statutorily delegating appellate jurisdiction 
and we cannot modify its decisions because 
we believe policy considerations so dictate. 
In conclusion, we affirm the orders of 
the district courts refusing to exercise jur-
isdiction. 
GARFF and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
J o | KEY NUHBIR SYSTEM > 
been committed or that the defendant com-
mitted it, the magistrate shall dismiss the in-
formation and discharge the defendant. The 
magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law. and an order of dismissal. The 
dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecu-
tion for the same offense. 
Bruno D'ASTON, Plaintiff 
and Appellee. 
v. 
Dorothy D'ASTON, et al., Defendants 
and Appellants. 
No. 890050-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 14, 1990. 
Action was brought for divorce. The 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd 
L. Park, J., entered decree of divorce, and 
wife appealed, challenging property distri-
bution. The Court of Appeals, 790 P.2d 
590, ordered wife to submit herself to pro-
cess of lower court within 30 days or her 
appeal would be dismissed. After wife 
gave notice of compliance with order, mer-
its of appeal were addressed. The Court of 
Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) post-
nuptial agreement not made in contempla-
tion of divorce was enforceable, absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure, 
and (2) postnuptial agreement unambig-
uously provided that it would apply to dis-
position of spouses' property in event of 
divorce. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Husband and Wife c=>30 
Prenuptial agreements are enforceable 
as long as there is no fraud, coercion, or 
material nondisclosure. 
2. Husband and Wife <s=30 
Postnuptial agreement not in contem-
plation of divorce is enforceable absent 
fraud, coercion, or material nondisclosure. 
3. Husband and Wife <s=>31(2) 
Normal rules of contract construction 
would be applied in resolving disagreement 
8. Defendants correctly claim that because the 
decision to allow an interlocutory appeal is dis-
cretionary, defendants might be forced to go 
through an unnecessary trial if the right to file 
an interlocutory appeal of the bindover order is 
denied. 
D'ASTON v. 
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between husband and wife regarding scope 
and meaning of postnuptial agreement. 
4. Husband and Wife <3=>31(2) 
Core principle in construing post-
nuptial agreement was to look to four cor-
ners of agreement to determine parties' 
intentions. 
5. Appeal and Error <s=>842(8) 
Threshold determination of whether 
writing is ambiguous, such that court may 
resort to extrinsic evidence of parties' in-
tent, is question of law, and thus trial 
court's determination is reviewed under 
correction-of-error standard, according no 
particular deference to trial court 
6. Evidence <s=>450(5) 
Postnuptial agreement between hus-
band and wife unambiguously provided 
that it would apply to disposition of parties' 
property in event of divorce and, therefore, 
extrinsic evidence regarding spouses' in-
tent in event of divorce should not have 
been considered, where postnuptial agree-
ment, entered into in community property 
state, provided that spouses' property 
would be divided and division would control 
for all purposes, and unambiguously and 
specifically referred to rebutting presump-
tion that all property acquired during mar-
riage was community property. 
7. Divorce <3»249.2 
Any equitable power of trial court to 
disregard otherwise enforceable post-
nuptial property settlement agreement and 
to distribute separate property of spouses 
at divorce had to be justified by unique and 
compelling circumstances. 
Brian C. Harrison (argued), Harris, Car-
ter & Harrison, Provo, for defendants and 
appellants. 
S. Rex Lewis (argued), Leslie W. Slaugh, 
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, Provo, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BILLINGS, GARFF and 
ORME, JJ. 
D'ASTON Utah 501 
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BILLINGS, Judge: 
Appellant, Dorothy D'Aston ("Wife"), ap-
peals from a divorce decree entered by the 
district court, principally claiming the court 
erred in failing to distribute the parties' 
property pursuant to a postnuptial agree-
ment. 
On appeal, Bruno D'Aston ("Husband") 
responded that since Wife was in contempt 
of the trial court and was avoiding court 
process, this court should not consider her 
appeal on the merits. We agreed with 
Husband and ordered Wife to submit her-
self to the process of the trial court within 
30 days or we would dismiss her appeal. 
See D'Aston v. D'Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Ct. 
App.1990). Wife gave us notice of her 
compliance with our order on May 4, 1990, 
and therefore we address the merits of her 
appeal in this opinion. 
We agree with Wife's contention that the 
trial court erred in failing to distribute the 
parties' property pursuant to their post-
nuptial agreement and therefore reverse 
and remand. 
Husband and Wife divorced on December 
15, 1988, after a 35-year marriage. In 
1973, Husband asked Wife to enter into a 
written property agreement, which had 
been prepared by his attorney. The agree-
ment was executed by both parties in 1973, 
then notarized and recorded in the State of 
California in 1975. 
Under the 1973 agreement, Wife received 
two parcels of real estate and cash. Hus-
band received all real property outside the 
United States; personal property in his pos-
session, which included $1 million in coins 
and a collection of antique cars; and all 
domestic and foreign patents and patent 
rights. The agreement also provided that 
all property acquired by either party in 
his/her own name would be the separate 
property of that person. Finally, the 
agreement provided that the parties would 
execute documents to implement the agree-
ment, and that each had the advice of coun-
sel, had read the agreement, and had not 
signed the agreement under duress, fraud 
or undue influence. Shortly after the 
agreement was signed, the parties con-
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veyed the property as provided in the 
agreement. 
On May 2, 1986, Husband filed for di-
vorce. Husband claimed that much of the 
tangible personal property given to him 
under the 1973 agreement had been stolen 
on April 30, 1986, the day Wife had asked 
him to leave their home. On July 31, 1986, 
Husband's California attorney, who had 
drafted the 1973 agreement, sent a letter to 
Wife's Utah attorney which stated the 1973 
agreement was in full force and effect 
Both parties at trial acknowledged they 
executed the 1973 agreement voluntarily 
and did not execute it under duress, fraud 
or undue influence. However, at trial, 
Husband claimed the 1973 agreement 
should not control the disposition of the 
parties' property in this divorce action be-
cause the agreement was entered into only 
to protect the couple's assets from possible 
creditors in pending litigation, not to dis-
tribute property in the event of divorce. 
Wife at trial claimed she had no knowledge 
of the alleged pending litigation and as-
sumed the 1973 agreement was to control 
for all purposes, including the possibility of 
divorce. 
1. See Huck v. Huck 734 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 
1986) ("it should be noted that in general, pre-
nuptial agreements concerning the disposition 
of property owned by the parties at the time of 
their marriage are valid so long as there is no 
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure"); 
Berman v. Berman, 749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988). 
2. See In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 
P.2d 7, 16 (1969) (en banc) ("[M]arital partners 
may in Arizona validly divide their property 
presently and prospectively by a post-nuptial 
agreement, even without its being incident to a 
contemplated separation or divorce," provided it 
is fair and equitable and is free from fraud, 
coercion or undue influence and that "wife act-
ed with full knowledge of the property involved 
and her rights therein."); In re Estate of Lewin, 
42 Coio.App. 129, 595 P.2d 1055, 1057 (1979) 
("Nuptial agreements, whether executed before 
or after the marriage, are enforceable in Colora-
do [and a] nuptial agreement will be upheld 
unless the person attacking it proves fraud, con-
cealment, or failure to disclose material infor-
mation."). See also In re Estate of Loughmiller, 
229 Kan. 584, 629 P.2d 156, 162 (1981) (post-
nuptial agreements, fairly and understanding^ 
made, are enforceable); In re Estate of Gab, 364 
N.W.2d 924, 925-26 (S.D.1985) (postnuptial 
The trial court held the 1973 agreement 
was not intended to control in the event of 
divorce, and thus, equitably divided all of 
the parties' property and awarded no alimo-
ny to either party. Wife appeals, claiming 
that (1) the trial court erred in dividing the 
parties' separate property in this divorce 
action contrary to the terms of the 1973 
agreement, (2) the trial court erred in deny-
ing Wife alimony, and (3) the conduct of 
the trial judge constituted judicial bias. 
VALIDITY OF POSTNUPTIAL 
AGREEMENTS 
[1,2] In Utah, prenuptial agreements 
are enforceable as long as there is no 
fraud, coercion or material nondisclosure.1 
Utah's courts have not yet considered the 
enforceability of postnuptial agreements 
not in contemplation of divorce. However, 
other jurisdictions review postnuptial prop-
erty agreements under the same standards 
as those applied to prenuptial agreements.2 
We agree with the majority of our neigh-
boring jurisdictions and thus hold that a 
postnuptial agreement is enforceable in 
Utah absent fraud, coercion, or material 
nondisclosure.3 
agreement to protect inheritance rights valid if 
property fairly disclosed and spouse enters into 
freely and for good consideration); Button v. 
Button, 131 Wis.2d 34, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 
(1986) (postnuptial agreement must meet re-
quirements of fair and reasonable disclosure, 
entered into voluntarily and freely, and substan-
tive provisions fair to each spouse). But cf. 
Ching v. Ching, 751 P.2d 93, 97 (Haw.Ct.App. 
1988) (general rule that property agreements 
should be enforced absent fraud or unconscion-
ability applies to prenuptial, but not to post-
nuptial, agreements). 
3. This postnuptial agreement was entered into 
in California. Under California law, married 
couples may contract to change the separate or 
community status of their property. Cai. Civil 
Code § 5103 (1990); In re Marriage of Dawley, 
17 Cai.3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 328 n. 6, 131 Cal. 
Rptr. 3 (1976). Further, married couples may 
enter into contracts with each other concerning 
their property rights as though unmarried, sub-
ject to rules controlling actions of persons occu-
pying confidential relations with each other. 
Haseltine v. Haseitine, 203 Cal.App.2d 48, 21 
Cal.Rptr. 238, 244 (1962); In re Estate of Marsh, 
151 Cal.App.2d 356. 311 P.2d 596, 599 (1957). 
California law is in harmony with Utah law on 
the issue of the enforceability and interpretation 
D'ASTON v. 
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Neither Husband nor Wife assert that 
the 1973 property agreement was entered 
into as a result of fraud or coercion nor do 
they contend that there was material non-
disclosure of the parties' assets. Thus, this 
postnuptial agreement should be enforced 
pursuant to its terms. 
Our conclusion, however, does not re-
solve this controversy as Husband and 
Wife disagree as to the meaning and scope 
of the 1973 postnuptial property agree-
ment Wife contends the agreement by its 
unambiguous terms applies in the event of 
divorce. Husband argues that it was exe-
cuted merely to protect the parties' proper-
ty from creditors and was not intended to 
control a distribution of the parties' proper-
ty in the event of divorce. Thus, we must 
determine what the parties intended when 
they entered into this 1973 agreement 
Utah courts have applied general con-
tract principles when interpreting prenup-
tial agreements. See Berman v. Bermarij 
749 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah CtApp.1988) (A 
prenuptial agreement should be treated 
like any other contract "In interpreting 
contracts, the principal concern is to deter-
mine what the parties intended by what 
they said."). This approach is consistent 
with other jurisdictions' treatment of post-
nuptial agreements.4 
[3,4] Thus, in order to resolve Husband 
and Wife's disagreement as to the scope 
and meaning of this postnuptial agreement, 
we apply normal rules of contract construc-
tion. The core principle is that in constru-
ing this contract we first look to the four 
corners of the agreement to determine the 
parties' intentions. See Neilson v. Neil-
son, 780 P.2d 1264, 1267 (Utah CtApp. 
of postnuptial agreements and thus we need not 
resolve the issue of which state's law should 
apply. 
4. See Matlock v. Matlock, 223 Kan. 679, 576 P.2d 
629, 633 (1978) ("(C]ontracts, made either be-
fore or after marriage, the purpose of which is 
to fix property rights between a husband and 
wife, are to be liberally interpreted to carry out 
the intentions of the makers and to uphold such 
contracts where they are fairly and understand-
D'ASTON Utah 5 0 3 
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1989); see also Ron Case Roofing & As-
phalt Paving Co. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); LDS Hosp. v. Cap-
itol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 
1988); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 
752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
[S-7] The relevant provisions of the 
1973 agreement denoting its scope and ap-
plication state, with our emphasis: 
1. The husband does transfer, bar-
gain, convey and quitclaim to the wife all 
of his right, title and interest, if any 
there be, in and to the following: 
(a) The real property at 14211 Sky-
line Drive, Hacienda Heights, Califor-
nia and in and to all buildings, appurte-
nances and fixtures thereon. 
(b) The "real property at 230 South 
Ninth Avenue, City of Industry, Cali-
fornia, including all buildings, appurte-
nances and fixtures thereon, and any 
and all oil and mineral rights thereto. 
(c) Any and all cash in bank ac-
counts located in the State of Califor-
nia. 
2. The wife transfers, bargains, con-
veys and quitclaims to the husband all of 
her right, title and interest in and to real 
property located outside of the United 
States of America, and in and to all per-
sonal property in the possession of the 
husband, or subject to his control in the 
United States, Europe or elsewhere in 
the world, and in and to all patents or 
patent rights under the laws of the Unit-
ed States, United Kingdom or any com-
monwealth thereof, Switzerland, Japan 
or other countries. The provisions of 
this paragraph apply to all property de-
scribed herein, whether presently owned 
ably made, are just and equitable in their provi-
sions, and are not ootained by fraud or over-
reaching."); Roberts v. Roberts, 381 So.2d 1333, 
1335 (Miss. 1980) ('The rules applicable to the 
construction of written contracts in general are 
to be applied in construing a postnuptial agree-
ment."); Bosone v. Bosone, 53 Wash.App. 614, 
768 P.2d 1022. 1024-25 (1989) ("a community 
property agreement is a contract, and effect 
should be given to the clearly expressed intent 
of the parties"). 
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or in existence or to be acquired or cre-
ated in the future. 
3. Hereafter, and until this agree-
ment is modified in writing attached 
hereto, all property, real, personal and 
mixed, acquired by either party in his or 
her sole name, from whatever source de-
rived and wherever situated, shall be the 
sole and separate property of such per-
son, notwithstanding any law, statute 
or court decision giving presumptive 
effect to the status of marriage; and 
such property shall be free of all claims, 
demand or liens of the other, direct or 
indirect, and however derived. 
This postnuptial agreement provides that 
Husband and Wife's property will be divid-
ed and the division will control for all pur-
poses. The agreement was entered into in 
a community property state and the con-
tractual language unambiguously and spe-
cifically refers to rebutting the presump-
tion that all property acquired during the 
marriage is community property. 
The trial court did not expressly conclude 
that the 1973 property agreement was am-
biguous, but nevertheless proceeded to 
take extrinsic evidence5 as to the parties' 
intentions and, based upon this controvert-
ed extrinsic evidence, concluded that the 
5. "Resort to extrinsic evidence of the parties' 
intent is permissible only if the contract doc-
ument appears to express the parties' agreement 
incompletely or if it is ambiguous in expressing 
that agreement." Neilson, 780 P.2d at 1267; see 
also Anderson v. Gardner, 647 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah 
1982) (only when an ambiguity exists which 
cannot be reconciled by an objective and rea-
sonable interpretation of the agreement as a 
whole should the court resort to evidence be-
yond the four corners of the agreement). 
6. Husband argues on appeal that even if we find 
the trial court erred when it found the 1973 
agreement was not intended to apply in the 
event of a divorce, the error was harmless be-
cause of the broad equitable powers trial courts 
possess in domestic matters. See Colman v. 
Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
However, even if a trial court has the equitable 
power to disregard an otherwise enforceable 
postnuptial property settlement agreement and 
to distribute the separate property of the spous-
es, the circumstances must be unique and com-
pelling to justify the application of such an 
parties did not intend the 1973 agreement 
to apply in the event of divorce. 
The threshold determination of whether 
a writing is ambiguous is a question of law, 
Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895; 
Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983); Whitehouse v. White-
house. 790 P.2d 57, 60-61 (CtApp.1990), 
and thus we review a trial court's determi-
nation under a correction-of-error standard, 
according no particular deference to the 
trial court Id.; see also Seashores Inc. v. 
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645, 647 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). 
We find this postnuptial agreement un-
ambiguously provides that it will apply to a 
disposition of the parties' property in the 
event of divorce.6 Thus, we reverse the 
trial court's contrary ruling which was 
based upon extrinsic evidence as to what 
Husband and Wife intended by their 1973 
agreement 
In summary, we reverse the trial court's 
property distribution and remand for en-
forcement of the 1973 postnuptial property 
agreement and then the division of the 
remaining property, if any, not controlled 
by it Because we reverse and remand the 
property division, we also reverse and re-
mand on the issue of alimony. We believe 
our decision necessitates the reconsidera-
tion of whether either Husband or Wife 
exception. The trial court made no findings to 
delineate what it found as compelling circum-
stances to justify such an action and we find 
none. 
In support of his argument. Husband claims 
that Utah courts have distributed premarital, 
gift or inheritance property of one spouse to the 
other spouse. See Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369, 
1373 (Utah 1988); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 
135 (Utah 1987); Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct.App.1988); Peterson v. 
Peterson, 748 P.2d 593. 595-96 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). We find these cases clearly distinguish-
able as they do not involve an otherwise en-
forceable prenupuai or postnuptial agreement. 
Husband also argues that Utah courts may 
refuse to apply property settlement agreements 
in a divorce action. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 
472, 476 (Utah 1975); Colman v. Colman, 743 
P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ci.App.1987). Again, these 
cases do not deal with postnuptial property set-
tlement agreements not in contemplation of di-
vorce and are otherwise factuailv distinguish-
able. 
JACOBSEN CONST, v. 
Ote as 794 P2d 
should receive alimony.7 
GARFF and ORME, JJ.f concur. 
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JACOBSEN, MORMN & ROBBINS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCH. Utah 505 
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ment and mailing satisfaction of judgment 
to contractor for execution which did not 
evidence an intent to appeal, where appeal 
did not involve a claim separate and distinct 
from those involved in satisfaction of judg-
ment, and board's counterclaim seeking re-
covery for alleged breach of contractor's 
duties under contract was not a separate 
and distinct controversy. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
v. 
ST. JOSEPH HIGH SCHOOL BOARD 
OF FINANCIAL TRUSTEES, 
Defendant and Appellant 
No. 890468-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 28, 1990. 
General contractor brought suit 
against high school board for balance due 
on a construction contact The Second Dis-
trict Court, Weber County, John F. Wahl-
quist, J., awarded, inter alia, judgment to 
the contractor and denied the board's coun-
terclaim seeking recovery premised on al-
leged fact that construction "deadlines" 
were not met. Board appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that the board's 
appeal was moot due to the board's paying 
of judgment and mailing of satisfaction of 
judgment to contractor, and fact that ap-
peal did not involve claims separate and 
distinct from those involved in satisfaction 
of judgment. 
Appeal dismissed. 
Appeal and Error <s»781(7) 
School board's appeal of judgment en-
tered in favor of general contractor on a 
construction contract with board was 
"moot" due to board's payment of judg-
7. We need not consider the issue of whether the 
trial court was biased against Wife as we have 
reversed the trial court's property distribution 
on other grounds. 
Edward J. McDonough, Salt Lake City, 
for defendant and appellant 
Michael Wilkins and Kendall S. Peterson, 
Tibbals, Howell, Moxley k Wilkins, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee. 




Plaintiff general contractor sued defen-
dant high school board for the balance due 
on a construction contract. The district 
court awarded judgment to plaintiff and 
denied defendant's counterclaim. We dis-
miss defendant's appeal as moot. 
In Juiy 1984, defendant St Joseph High 
School Board of Financial Trustees ("high 
school") executed a written contract with 
plaintiff Jacobsen, Morrin & Robbins Con-
struction Company ("contractor,,)l for con-
struction work on St. Joseph High School 
in Ogden, Utah. Two separate projects 
were encompassed by the contract—the re-
modeling of a gymnasium and locker 
rooms, and the addition of a classroom and 
library. 
Using a standard form contract publish-
ed by the American Institute of Architects, 
high school agreed to pay contractor the 
total cost of construction plus a five-per-
cent supervision fee. No firm costs were 
established in the contract, although "bud-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 







Civil No. CV 86 1124 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The defendant Dorothy D'Aston personally appeared before the Court on the 4th 
day of May, 1990, in person and was represented by her counsel, Brian C. Harrison. 
Plaintiff appeared in person and by his counsel, S. Rex Lewis of Howard, Lewis & Petersen. 
The Court considered its Amended Order of Commitment dated the 26th day of May, 1989, 
together with its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated April 13, 1989, and having 
heard representations made by defendant's counsel, as well as by the defendant, and the 
defendant having previously been found in contempt of an order of this Court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant may purge herself of the contempt order of this Court by 
depositing with the Court the sum of 5236,800.00. The defendant is given ^6 days from May 
4, 1990 to purge herself of her contempt. 
2. In the event the defendant fails to make the aforesaid deposit, the 
defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period of sixty (60) days. 
3. Unless previously modified by an Order of this Court, the Court will review 
the Commitment Order on June 22, 1990, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. at which time the 
defendant is ordered to appear in person before the Court. The Court will make its review 
on that date prior to committing the defendant to jail. 
4. The Bench Warrant previously entered herein on the 13th day of April, 1989 
is hereby withdrawn. 
DATED this day of May, 1990. 
BY THE COURT 
JOYD L. PARK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this day of May, 1990. 
Brian C Harrison, Esq. 
3325 No. University Avenue 
Suite 200 




HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO D'ASTON, } 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs- ] 
DOROTHY D'ASTON ; 
Defendant. ] 
\ NOTICE OF APPEARANCE 
) Civil No. CV-86-1124 
) Judge Boyd L. Park 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS: 
You will hereby take notice that the Defendant, Dorothy 
D*Aston, appeared before me on the 4th day of May, 1990 for further 
Court proceedings as required by your opinion in Case 
U&\Ca*i ******'*' 
Number 890050-CA filed April 9, 1990. 
The Defendant is still in contempt of Court, but has been 
granted 45 days in which to purge her contempt. Additional 
proceedings have been scheduled for June 22, 1990 to review this 
matter. 
DATED this ' day of "^'h.-- 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ 
r~? *- '+ / s ' ' - ? -
Honorable Boyd L. Park 
APPROVED AS TO FORM^ 
- ^ , . . . — -
' • • ' m . . . • • !<» r ^ 
S„ Rex Lewis^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Notice of Compliance on this 1 day of 
h-i , t989, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to 
the following. / W 
S. Rex Lewis 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
The Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Secretary 
EXHIBIT E 
HARRIS, CARTER & HARRISON 
Brian C. Harrison 
Attorney for Defendant 
3325 North University Avenue, #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: 375-9801 
Utah State Bar #1388 
IN TOE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRUNO ASTON, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
-vs- ] 
DOROTHY ASTON, et al, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER 
1 Civil No. CV-86-1124 
) Judge Boyd L. Park 
THIS MATTER having come on regularly for hearing on the 
26th day of October, 1990, Plaintiff being represented by his 
attorney, S. Rex Lewis, and the Defendant being present and 
represented by her attorneys, Brian C. Harrison and Don Mullen, and 
the Court having considered the evidence submitted and the 
testimony of the Defendant and argument of counsel, and being fully 
advised in the premises; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. On May 22, 1990, this Court entered an order relative to 
Defendant's contempt and continued the matter until this date to 
further consider this matter. The Court finds that Defendant does not 
have the ability to comply with the order of May 22, 1990, and 
modifies said order as follows: 
a. Defendant is ordered committed to jail for a period 
of five days with said commitment to be suspended upon the 
payment of a fine in the sum of $250.00. Defendant may have 90 
days to pay said fine. 
2. The Court is seriously concerned about the doatn threat 
MSM LksL 
irontiy' which was apparonfly made to Defendant's attorney, and reserves 
the issue of inquiring into said 4hfeat-ywhen all parties are before the 
Court. 
DATED this day of //0&40~£e£^ 1990. 
Approved 
Boyd L. Park 
District Court Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I personally mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Order on this (j&- day of /flpfXM+rJbL*. 
1990, by first-class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
S. Rex Lewis 
120 East 300 North 
P.O. Box 778 
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